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Women, Gender and Daesh Radicalisation: A Milieu Approach 
 
ELIZABETH PEARSON AND EMILY WINTERBOTHAM 
 
In this article, Elizabeth Pearson and Emily Winterbotham explore the role of gender in 
radicalisation to Daesh, noting possible factors in female radicalisation, and key 
differences in the factors of radicalisation between men and women. They find that 
enabling factors, mechanisms and locations can depend upon the gender of the recruit, 
due to differences in gender norms. The article challenges assumptions that the 
recruitment of young men and women to Daesh follows identical patterns, as well as the 
narrative of women as peaceful, or as coerced into joining Daesh, revealing the 
importance of female empowerment in the group’s appeal.  
 
Women have long participated in ‘terrorist’ organisations, whether as fighters for movements 
such as the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, the Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party (PKK), some of whom are now fighting Daesh (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria, ISIS or IS), or as ‘Black Widow’ suicide attackers and hostage takers in 
Chechnya.1 Female terrorists such as Leila Khaled have been active in Palestinian 
organisations, with many other less well-known figures involved in bombing, recruiting and 
vigorously supporting the cause.2 Women were regarded as an important resource to Al-
Qa’ida, even if not involved in physical jihad.3 Despite this, research on terrorism still tends 
to neglect the participation of women in violent groups,4 for which there are a number of 
reasons. First, terrorism research has often focused on perpetrators of physical violence, 
which have predominantly been men.5 Women have historically been mainly involved in 
non-violent, supportive roles, as spies, sympathisers and ‘dominant forces’, which is to say 
they provide leadership, ideology, strategy or motivation.6 For some governments such non-
violent action has not been a counterterrorism priority, and where women have not been 
arrested, their roles are not represented in official data. Second, the minority status of women 
in the formal structures and organisational roles of terrorist groups means there are fewer of 
them, and therefore they are less accessible as a research group.7 Third, an insufficient gender 
focus in security institutions has often resulted in bias against considering women, even when 
they are embedded in the roots of terrorist organisations and their supporting movements.8  
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However, recently, the role of women in terrorism has become the subject of intense debate 
in Western policy, media and academia due to the focus on the migration, or hijra, of 
thousands of young women to Daesh. The majority have travelled from North Africa and the 
Middle East, with 700 from Tunisia alone by 2015.9 The West has focused, however, on 
those hundreds who have joined Daesh from Europe, the US, Australia and Canada.10 Daesh 
is the latest of decades of ‘Salafi-Jihadi’ groups, which aim to establish Islamic States 
through violence. One of the key differentiating features of Daesh, when contrasted with 
other ‘Salafi-Jihadi’ movements such as Al Qaeda, is its territorial ambition, and the desire to 
build a functioning Islamic State of global fighters in Syria and Iraq, as the first steps towards 
a global ‘caliphate’.11 Families have been central to the creation of the Islamic State, with a 
focus on creating infrastructure and society through citizens living under strict sharia law. 
Women have therefore been sought as citizens, to marry fighters, mother children, and 
propagandise.12 This contrasts with the important but primarily supportive role envisaged by 
Al-Qa’ida for its female members. For some in the West this migration of mainly young 
teenage girls (but also older women) to Daesh has been hard to comprehend, as it has been 
assumed that women would not want to live in openly violent societies where female roles 
are perceived to be highly constrained by sharia law. One dominant media narrative in their 
recruitment has therefore suggested these ‘naïve’ ‘jihadi brides’ have been ‘groomed’ by 
men.13 
 
This article, the second in a series on women and the gender dynamics of violent extremism 
and countering violent extremism (CVE),14 contributes to the understanding of the complex 
reasons for Western female radicalisation to Daesh. The concept of gender has been used to 
frame findings, ‘gender’ describing contextually dependent beliefs determining expectations 
of male and female behaviour.15 Therefore the gender dynamics of male Daesh engagement 
are also reappraised. The analysis uses an innovative milieu-based qualitative methodology, 
with research conducted in communities that have experienced cases of radicalisation, 
including those with direct experience of family members travelling to Syria/Iraq to join 
Daesh. Interviews and focus groups were conducted in five countries – the UK, Canada, 
France, Germany and the Netherlands. Three of these – the UK, France and Germany – are 
among the highest European contributors of recruits to Daesh.16  
 
The analysis challenges some pervasive myths often propagated by the media about female 
radicalisation, particularly that women are ‘lured’ into Daesh. It instead suggests that Daesh 
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can provide an important source of empowerment to young women. It also highlights key 
differences in the practical mechanisms through which males and females are recruited, due 
to culturally determined gender expectations. These were shared to a surprisingly high degree 
across countries, despite the different demographics and heritage of Muslim communities in 
the countries taking part in the research. These shared aspects are emphasised, with 
differences noted as they arise. 
 
[A-head] Gender, Women and Radicalisation: the Theoretical Basis 
‘Radicalisation’ is a highly problematic term.17 It is politicised, and frequently associated 
with the broad-brush targeting of counterterror intervention of Muslim communities in the 
West.18 It has also failed to offer a clear understanding of how and why one person joins a 
terrorist group, when another does not. It is understood by some as the pathway to violence 
(behavioural), and by others as the pathway to extreme thought (cognitive).19 Theoretical 
radicalisation models developed over the years, however, suggest the necessity of multilevel 
analysis. This incorporates a range of factors, from personal questions of agency and 
individual reward, to issues of identity and belonging, to structural pressures, such as an 
inability to find employment, to organisational factors, such as the chance to fight in a high-
status group.21 There are also push and pull factors. Pull factors might also include well-
framed ideological messages by terror organisations, aimed at the target group.22 Push factors 
include societal pressures, such as discrimination or poverty.23 Radicalisation is regarded as a 
collective enterprise, facilitated by kinship or friendship groups, with only a minority 
favouring lone action.24 Enabling factors include the ‘how’, ‘who’ and ‘where’: the 
charismatic preachers, radical mosques, prisons, the internet, or other recruitment grounds.25  
 
The conceptual basis lies in the pyramid model of radicalisation, which understands that 
terrorists emerge from broader communities of support. The logic is that at the bottom are the 
broad potential support bases, which may be targeted by violent groups. From this wide 
community emerges the sympathetic support base, and immediate social environment of 
extremist actors, what Waldmann and Malthauer term the ‘radical milieu’. Together these 
communities comprise the physical or social setting in which radicalisation occurs.27 At the 
top of the pyramid are a tiny number of individuals actually willing to commit violence. 
Salafi-Jihadi groups have explicitly – but not exclusively – focused messaging on young 
Muslims in the wider milieu, the community of heritage Muslims, exploiting arguments 
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about popular shared concerns, such as unjust foreign policy, discrimination or injustice.28 
This has had implications for corresponding CVE approaches. 
 
Little of the work on radicalization has, however, considered women or gender. Rather than 
incorporating gender into radicalisation frameworks, women have been considered as being 
in the margins. A number of authors have framed female radicalisation to terrorism in 
personal terms.29 Mia Bloom, a leading author on women and terrorism, for example, 
highlights the ‘four Rs’ – revenge, redemption, relationship and respect, along with the 
incidence of rape among violent extremist women.30 Feminist authors on female terrorism 
meanwhile criticise any emphasis on the personal as playing to stereotypes, which 
depoliticises female violence.31 In fact women, like men, join violent extremist groups for 
many reasons, both personal and political.32 Mark Sageman notes, for example, that jihadi 
groups offer young men a particular high-status brand of masculinity – fighters are the ‘rock 
stars’ of militant Islam.33 Organisational factors also strongly influence both male and female 
recruitment. Militant organisations need male fighters and authorities recognize this. Women 
may however be recruited due to this assumption, which often makes them better able to 
carry out attacks or transport weapons undetected.34  
 
Daesh has had a great impact on the recruitment of women, and explicitly targeted females. 
Women have been a significant demographic in those travelling to Syria and Iraq in support 
of the caliphate announced by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Daesh, in 2014. A 2014 
report estimated that 18% of EU origin Daesh jihadis – about 350 – were women.35 The total 
number is now thought to be in excess of 550.36 Daesh formulates women’s roles primarily as 
mothers, wives and propagandists. Women who have joined Daesh, however, strongly 
support violence, and many have made it clear that they would be willing to carry out attacks, 
if needed.37 There is, however, little indication yet that Daesh is ordering female violence in 
Syria or Iraq, even as their territories are recaptured.38 As with online recruiters for Al-
Qa’ida, such as Malika El Aroud,39 Daesh women are also active online, and in her study of 
ISIS Twitter support, Jytte Klausen describes their collective influence as ‘The Umm Factor’, 
a reference to the Islamic honorific ‘Umm’, frequently adopted by female extremists.40 
Studies of online material posted by Western females suggest they joined Daesh for reasons 
including: a rejection of Western feminism; online contact with recruiters who offer marriage 
and adventure; the influence of peers or family; adherence to the ideology and politics of 
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Islamic State; naïvety and romantic optimism; and the chance to be part of something new, 
exciting, and illicit.41 
 
The five countries covered in the research have all experienced female as well as male 
radicalisation to Daesh: a small number of Canadian women and girls have travelled to 
Daesh, and others have been prevented from doing so.42 France, which has contributed more 
fighters to Daesh than any other Western country, around 1,200, estimates that some 30% of 
all French jihadists are women and girls; and 25% of these are converts to Islam. The figure 
is 20% for men.43 Women were involved in both Paris attacks, and in a number of recently 
disrupted plots.44 Meanwhile, in the Netherlands women have long supported Islamist 
extremism.45 Since 2013 more than 50 Dutch women have travelled to Iraq and Syria, and an 
estimated 20 children have been born there to them.46 In the UK, the Metropolitan police 
suggests that more than 56 women and girls have travelled to Iraq and Syria, just below 10% 
of the total of 600; and of almost 700 Germans in Iraq and Syria, 21% are women. Since the 
call for European jihadis to join the caliphate, as many as 38% of Germans travelling there 
are women.47  
 
[A-head] Methodology 
The research engaged with questions of why and how women are radicalised to Daesh; how 
this compares to male radicalisation; and the gender dynamics involved; in other words, the 
impact of gender norms on the radicalisation process. This article deals only with 
radicalisation to Daesh, due to the participant-led nature of the research, with Daesh the focus 
of group discussion. The research drew on the knowledge of professionals, family members 
of those who have been radicalised, and the communities in which radicalisation has occurred 
– the radical milieu.   
  
Research took place in five countries within Muslim communities in cities where there had 
been known instances of people supporting or joining Daesh: Canada, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and the UK. These countries were selected due to key differences in CVE 
approaches addressing the same primary threats. Two qualitative methods were adopted: 
focus group discussions, and semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews were 
used to talk to family groups or individuals with direct radicalisation experience; individuals 
themselves; and professionals working with such individuals and their families. These 
interviews involved the least researcher intervention as possible, to enable a participant-led 
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approach. Gatekeepers such as mosques, community groups and women’s groups were 
approached to assist in participant recruitment.  
 
Twenty expert interviews were carried out with professionals in the field, including NGO 
officials, leaders of youth groups, the heads of community centres, police officers, local 
authority coordinators, and mosque leaders. The family members of five young individuals 
who had been radicalised also provided interviews. Additionally, the responses of 157 men, 
women and young people (aged over sixteen due to reasons of consent) were collected in 27 
focus groups, which elicited information in group discussions through interaction and 
consensus forming.48 Participants were identified according to stratified sampling, aimed at 
homogeneity based on agreed criteria of age and gender. This saw participants engage in 
women-only, men-only, or youth discussions, where appropriate. 
 
Focus groups brought together community members to provide cultural and contextual 
understanding of the broader milieu in which radicalisation occurs. Although research 
locations were selected based on prior cases of radicalisation to Daesh, participants were not 
selected on the basis of any direct experience. Despite this, in almost half of the focus groups 
(thirteen), most participants had personal experience of radicalisation taking place in their 
family, friends or community. We therefore draw a distinction between those with little 
knowledge or experience of radicalisation (non-expert participants) and others with first-hand 
understanding of losing individuals to Daesh (expert participants). This was an unanticipated 
but highly useful aspect of the community research. The perceptions of community members 
are fundamental to understanding the context in which radicalisation takes place: the norms, 
narratives and indeed preconceptions of the milieu. They also provide factual information and 
therefore add to the academic research about radicalisation. Care has been taken throughout 
this article to demonstrate where community perceptions are simply that; where they differ 
from the findings of the research to date; and where they provide new information, for 
example on the locations of radicalisation. 
 
Fieldwork was undertaken from October 2015 to January 2016. Each participant response 
was then coded and analysed using ATLAS.ti software. The six-month time-frame meant the 
original research goal of interviewing radicalised individuals could not be realised. What this 
research provides, however, is original data that develops current understandings, through 
professionals, the families of those radicalised, and communities. 
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[A-head] Why and How Are Men and Women Radicalised? 
The different factors involved in radicalisation were noted during the research, including the 
observations of those participants who are part of the milieu, and fresh data provided by those 
closest to young people who had travelled, or considered travelling, to Iraq and Syria to join 
Daesh. The experiences of those taking part in the focus groups included: being approached 
online by Daesh recruiters; knowing people in the community who had joined the group or 
had left for Syria/Iraq; and street radicalisation. Direct focus group experience of 
radicalisation was highest in the Netherlands (in four out of five groups), with four groups in 
Canada, two in Germany, two in France and one in the UK. 
 
[B-head] Radicalisation, Gender and the Milieu: Received Wisdom 
All community focus groups across countries began with the question, ‘What do you 
understand by the terms “extremism” and “radicalisation”?’, which they uniformly connected 
with Islamism, and particularly Daesh. The aggregate findings of the focus groups as a whole 
(without distinguishing between expert and non-expert participants) suggested five shared 
factors as most important in radicalisation for both genders: issues of belonging and identity; 
the internet; youth; status; and the wrong interpretation of Islam. All these factors are 
consistent with the academic literature.49  
 
Again, considering all focus group responses, a gender bias was evident in the beliefs about 
the factors for male and female radicalisation. Female radicalisation was perceived to be 
driven by factors related to grooming and/or exploitation, the lure of marriage, and the desire 
to achieve social status through association with a male jihadi. Male radicalisation was linked 
most frequently with a misinterpretation of Islam, radical mosques or preachers, emotion 
(anger and hot-headedness explicitly), and a backlash against Western foreign policy. These 
were not identified as factors in female radicalisation. Research suggests political motivations 
are actually common to men and women.50 The community responses, however, demonstrate 
the ways in which community norms frame male and female behaviour in gendered ways. 
These gender narratives constitute an important context to the later findings, and in particular 
the ways in which community, family and friends are likely to respond to initial signs of 
radicalisation in young women and men.  
 
[B-head] Grievances, Resilience and the Gender Impact of Discrimination  
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The research found frequent reference at the community level to grievances such as 
socioeconomic disadvantages, feeling of a lack of belonging and failed integration as factors 
in radicalisation. Structural factors – in particular economic, social and political 
marginalisation, or perceptions of this – when coinciding with perceived discrimination along 
religious or ethnic lines are widely believed to facilitate an environment that is conducive to 
radicalisation.51 These findings indicate the pressures on communities at the milieu level, and 
how they apply to gender. 
 
Participants with first-hand experience of radicalisation (expert participants) believed 
grievances became ‘active’ in catalysing radicalisation when combined with both personal 
discrimination and inadequate coping mechanisms. The types of discrimination described 
differed for young males and females. In the Netherlands, the family of a boy radicalised and 
later killed in Syria believed that his failure to win an internship, while friends from non-
Muslim backgrounds had succeeded, had been a key factor driving him to Daesh. The mother 
of a Muslim convert in Germany who tried to leave for Iraq/Syria described how her son had 
been attacked due to being mixed race and that he was ‘treated differently by police’ and 
blamed for the offences of his friends. Communities described the ways in which 
expectations of young men and young women differed. They also discussed their view that 
when young men failed to meet expectations, because of (perceived) societal injustice, they 
may be more susceptible to Daesh messaging, which offered status. 
 
Muslim female participants also described perceived injustice as a factor in the radicalisation 
of young women. Community members described their experiences of public Islamophobia, 
linked to female dress and appearance, presenting a milieu in which Daesh messages 
addressing these issues had a chance of resonating. Most female Muslim participants chose to 
wear the hijab, and Islamic dress was important to them. A lack of societal acceptance of 
clothing choices, including the hijab, niqab or traditional long black robes, was strongly 
associated with feelings of exclusion, marginalisation and discrimination, and as possible 
push factors to Daesh. A mother in the Netherlands whose daughter had left to join Daesh 
described how the refusal of a place at college due to her preference to wear the niqab was a 
key factor in her radicalisation process, ‘that really felt like rejection’. 
 
This finding was particularly marked in countries, for instance the Netherlands, Germany and 
France, where there have been bans on the wearing of the headscarf in certain public 
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positions and locations, arguably constraining women’s ability to exercise full citizenship.52 It 
was also in these countries that generational division emerged, with some older Muslim 
women, including those who wear the headscarf, expressing the view that the burqa and the 
niqab are potential indicators of female radicalisation. In Germany, one woman who wears 
the hijab stated, ‘It’s mostly people who wear the niqab [who are radicalised]’. Other Muslim 
women believed clothing such as the burqa was an indicator not of piety, but something more 
sinister, given it is not demanded in Islam. As one French woman said, ‘A person whose 
body is covered from top to bottom. This is extreme Islam. ... a radical interpretation’. Such 
views may reflect a simple generation gap, but they may also reflect the dominant narratives 
of the countries in which they live, where the burqa is frequently discussed as a sign of 
extremism. This was of note, as the literature frequently addresses a rejection of the norms of 
older members of Muslim communities as a factor in radicalisation.  
 
Women in the UK and Canada, which do not have clothing bans, were however also affected 
by such issues. They too linked a lack of ability to fulfil a societal role because of 
Islamophobia with susceptibility to Daesh messaging. As one older Muslim woman in 
Canada described it, ‘Our girls are educated, but also religious. They learn to be doctors, 
nurses, everything – then people say “no job” because of their appearance and wearing the 
hijab. So what have they left? They say, “I worship my Allah”.’ Some women, even though 
they oppose Daesh, described empathy for women drawn to Daesh by feelings of exclusion in 
the West, which they believed was in large part due to discrimination over appearance. This 
perception again suggests the ways in which Daesh messaging may resonate in communities 
on this issue. It should be noted that male participants also described feelings of estrangement 
from societies where females who wore the hijab or niqab faced discrimination, because they 
had empathy with their female relatives. 
 
[A-head] Individual Factors 
[B-head] Gendered Identity Crisis, the Hijab and the Pull of Daesh 
Research on both those with direct experience of radicalisation, and within broader milieus, 
supported the importance of the search for identity among young people who did not feel that 
they belonged in their society or country. The mother of a convert deterred from travelling to 
join Daesh from Germany reflected on the role of identity in her son’s radicalisation, saying, 
‘he tried lots of things – like Buddhism. He was just looking for something ... a path of some 
kind’. Other family members offered similar reflections, consistent with the substantial 
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research showing many join terrorist groups as part of a search for meaning in their lives.53 
‘Identity crisis’ can be a significant source of ‘vulnerability’.54 In a study of more than 2,000 
foreign fighters in Al-Qa’ida-linked movements, Colonel John M Venhaus of the US Army 
concluded, ‘they all were looking for something […] [T]hey want to understand who they 
are, why they matter, and what their role in the world should be ... which al-Qaeda offers to 
fill’.55  
 
Participants reflected on the ways the search for an identity included gender, with Daesh’s 
caliphate representing a space in which a minority of young women might feel accepted – a 
significant pull factor when considered against a background of societal discrimination. 
However, discrimination could also come from within communities, as suggested by the 
‘generation gap’ already referenced. One German woman, a non-expert participant in her 
mid-20s, described her struggle with her family’s rejection of her decision to cover and wear 
long black clothing. She felt that other young women facing similar pressure might look to 
Daesh for confirmation of their beliefs:  
 
I’ve been wearing the headscarf for almost three years now. And I had months where I had no 
contact with my family because they didn’t accept it. And … many people, particularly young 
people, just aren’t capable of taking on this struggle. That’s why they just give up and cut 
contact with their families, because they just don’t try to understand you … so the girls 
separate themselves and find someone on the internet who motivates them ... and then one 
night they just disappear, in the middle of the night, and then two weeks later you find out 
that they’re in Syria. 
 
This view offers an important insight into a scenario familiar to professionals working with 
young recruits to Daesh. One German deradicalisation professional described how she had 
heard many stories from radicalised young women identifying this as a factor in the 
radicalisation process. In one case, she provided anecdotal evidence of a girl from a Muslim 
family whose father referred to her friends who wore the burqa as ‘your terrorist girlfriends’. 
This had caused a rift between parent and child that led to her gradual radicalisation.  
 
A lack of acceptance of female Muslim attire was strongly associated with a sense that Daesh 
might represent (and indeed frames itself as) a location where pious women could belong. 
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These attitudes affirmed the likelihood of Daesh messaging on this issue to be met with 
positive reception. One German Muslim student in her 20s said: 
 
There are girls who say, well, I’ll go and find somewhere where everyone looks like me. 
Where they are accepted with the headscarf. And ISIS, that’s how they advertise themselves 
to people, and I think that’s how all this starts really.  
 
Indeed, research into the social media accounts of women who had left for Syria and Iraq has 
revealed that women were not only rejecting the culture and foreign policy of the West, but 
actively embracing a new vision for society. These women, the research identified, felt they 
were migrating to an area where they could live honourably ‘under the law of Shariah’.56  
 
This finding is significant because it reveals contradictions in community responses. As a 
whole, communities associated ideological motives with young male radicalisation. 
However, when involved in detailed discussion, female religious conviction and its 
expression was emphasised by both expert and non-expert participants as a key female 
rationale for joining Daesh. 
 
[B-head] Agency, Marriage and Grooming 
Marriage was, on aggregate, the second-highest cited factor driving radicalisation for 
females. Many participants across countries identified ‘naïvety’ as the key factor in drawing 
young females into Daesh, through a promise of marriage. This view is hardly surprising, 
given the much-publicised reporting on ‘jihadi brides’. Many of the research participants – 
both expert and non-expert – felt the ‘grooming’ narrative best described this situation. These 
responses appeared to reflect inherent gender biases in Muslim communities, the media and 
wider society. The majority of research participants therefore accepted the link between the 
radical Islamism of Daesh and the submission of women to men, and expressed more 
conflicting opinions about women’s agency or political commitment to the group as an 
important factor in their radicalisation. They felt that joining Daesh was not a choice women 
would make if they had total freedom and access to, as they suggested, ‘the facts’. In the UK 
the term often used, particularly by middle-aged and older Muslim men and women, was 
‘brainwashing.’  
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The perception that young females had less agency than young males in the radicalization 
‘process’ was associated with a belief that they are less, as some participants termed it, 
‘streetwise’, potentially less educated on the issues surrounding radicalisation, and therefore 
less able to critically engage with Daesh narratives. This reflected the perception expressed 
across the focus groups that cultural norms affect young men and women in different ways. 
Many described the impact of patriarchal values sometimes experienced in parts of Muslim 
communities on lowering both female esteem and resilience to recruitment by Daesh. As one 
British Muslim woman in her 30s expressed: 
 
Well, if someone is oppressed? Or looked down on, or a housewife, and somebody comes 
online and talks nicely, respects you, compliments you – women are more likely to respond to 
that. Young ladies going to Syria to be wives – they’re all being played.  
 
One woman in France described a situation that she knew about: 
 
She fell in love with a convert Frenchman and wanted to marry him, but her parents said no. 
So she ran away ... and they got married. The man went to Syria and she followed him. She 
was a very pretty girl, but she did not see it herself ... she never looked you in the eye. Very 
insecure. So she fell for it. 
 
This account provides factual information alongside gender bias, which the participant 
employs to rationalise the event, and understand it according to expectations of female 
behaviour. This image of being ‘played’ or ‘falling for it’ therefore reveals an implicit 
assumption among Muslim communities of women’s passivity in radicalisation. Although 
there are undoubtedly cases where the grooming narrative does fit, this is not always the case. 
The views of focus group participants of women radicals as ‘vulnerable’, ‘naïve’ or 
‘groomed’ contradict evidence that women who join Daesh do actively support violence; this 
also suggests that this risk of female radicalisation may not be easy to spot, as it contradicts 
community norms about how women should behave.57 
 
Thus, men and boys were ascribed agency in their radicalisation process and criticised for 
making the wrong choices, while more allowances were made for women and girls. Male 
radicalisation was more frequently linked with discrimination in the workplace or by 
authorities, and was perceived not as grooming, even when male research participants 
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associated the support of males who were radicalised to Daesh with Islamophobia and 
emotional responses, such as anger and frustration. This again suggests that community 
understandings of male and female roles differ and need to be engaged in order to counter 
radicalisation. 
 
[B-head] Status and the Pull Factor of Daesh 
While women joining Daesh were generally perceived as naïve, participants also emphasised 
the rationality of their decision to travel to Syria and Iraq. Research participants emphasised 
that women might agree with the principles of Daesh and reject Western values such as 
feminism, gender equality and consumerism, which led at times to contradictory views in 
focus groups regarding female agency itself. Perhaps surprisingly, gaining status was more 
strongly associated with female than male radicalisation in focus groups, and by interviewees 
and professionals working in the field. Attaining status through Daesh was seen to have a 
dual function: it could be a rejection of traditional family gender norms (which serve to 
constrain girls) and a bid for independence and a new identity; or it could act as a rejection of 
Western norms and a family that was perceived as not religious enough. 
 
The subject came up most frequently in France and the Netherlands, where research 
participants reflected most frequently on the restriction of movement and behaviour of 
women and girls at home. Women in France suggested power could be gained by association 
with the struggle itself, which gave women a perceived position of influence, or with actors 
in that struggle, who are regarded as ‘heroes’. One Muslim woman from the Netherlands 
offered a similar reflection, ‘Girls are extra protected. This subordinated position … 
contributes to their radicalisation. Because they don’t mean much at home they want to be 
somewhere else where they play an important part, they think’. This perception fed into the 
stories of expert participants. One Dutch Muslim woman again used a similar understanding 
of the highly gendered nature of community roles to rationalise the actions of young women 
she knew who had joined Daesh: 
 
Within radical groups women have a different role. They get – according to them – more 
recognition and are seen as important for the group. So that also plays a part in radicalisation. 
… the motive for those who want to participate is the longing for recognition and a more 
important position. 
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This offers a valuable insight again into ways with which Daesh female recruitment 
narratives might resonate. In contrast, expert participants believed financial incentives were 
an important factor in male radicalisation. Several focus groups of both men and women in 
France and the Netherlands specifically cited cases in which money was offered by recruiters 
to men. Though it is not known whether money was also offered to women who had 
radicalized the implicit link between men and money reflects the  expectation of the male as 
breadwinner, alongside Islamophobia and discrimination, they believed this Daesh tactic had 
great success with those struggling to find work. One male expert participant in the 
Netherlands provided anecdotal knowledge of local male radicalisation: 
 
There were two youngsters from this neighbourhood. One gets to work, the other doesn’t. The 
reason is appearance. Pakistani clothing with a beard. As soon as you walk around like that 
you don’t have a job. One boy left because that happened, I have money for you in Syria, he 
was told. 
 
Again, the participant provided data – anecdotal evidence of payment to young men – filtered 
through gendered norms within the milieu.  
 
[A-head] Gender Difference in Mechanisms and Spaces of Recruitment 
Consistently across countries, participants described highly gendered norms regulating both 
public and private life in ways that shaped the possibilities for male and female action, and 
the spaces in which this might occur, according to the different expectations associated with 
men and women.  
This was relevant to the discussion of enabling factors, such as radical preachers, mosques, or 
networks with extremist associations. Norms were consistent between expert and non-expert 
participants, and across countries. One of the most frequently asserted views was that radical 
recruitment of young people was predominantly face to face for men and boys, and online for 
women and girls. Expert participants gave accounts of the online radicalisation of young 
women and offline radicalisation of young men from their milieu, while those speculating on 
the possibilities for radicalisation concurred, describing a lack of female access to public 
space. 
 
[B-head] Public Space 
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Anecdotal information received from focus groups in the Netherlands, France and Germany 
revealed that differences between male and female radicalisation were particularly apparent 
in public spaces, such as on city streets, where men appeared more vulnerable. This was not a 
feature of responses from the UK or Canada. One young Dutch Muslim woman explained: 
 
What I noticed on the street was that youngsters were radicalising right under my nose. Most 
of them … are basic Muslims, they know little about Islam. But when you encounter the 
wrong people who try and make you believe all kinds of things, you [just] believe it.  
 
A German Muslim mother described her alarm when her teenage son was approached in the 
street by a stranger: 
 
He asked my son if he was a Muslim and he said yes, if he knew a Surah [Islamic Qur’anic 
verse], and he didn’t. So he said, “come with me … you’re Muslim, you need to know”. And 
got him to go with him. Fifteen years old. Last year that was, and his friends went along too 
… And my other son who’s ten has also been approached on the street in the same way! 
 
This was a familiar situation to German experts working in CVE, who also described 
frequent occurrences of city street radicalisation of young men. In another German Muslim 
focus group, participants described how their local mosque had been targeted by radical 
preachers who approached men and boys on the street outside. Although women and girls 
also attend this mosque, cultural expectations restricted their movements, and young women 
were never unaccompanied outside, so they had been left alone. There was therefore 
consensus between expert and non-expert participants about the role of traditional cultural 
gender roles. Non-expert participants speculated that this could protect women from 
radicalisation, as young girls were less likely to be permitted the freedoms, frequently 
perceived as dangers, which young men enjoyed. One mother of Egyptian descent in the 
Netherlands said: 
 
Because [females] are not as active in the mosque and one expects a different sort of lifestyle 
and behaviour. They are at home more. Boys are allowed more. Also from Islam and culture 
the boys have more rights ... That has now protected the women against radicalisation 
because they cannot move easily. 
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Indeed, in France a non-expert participant living in an area locally identified as a ‘banlieue’ 
described what she perceived as public gender segregation outside working hours, ‘The 
banlieues are completely male-dominated after six pm, there are no girls outside. So it is 
really hard to radicalise them’. The milieu thus offers an insight into the different enabling 
factors of radicalisation, given these gender norms. 
 
[B-head] Private Space  
Focus group participants and professional experts described how cultural restrictions that 
protected girls in public served to put them at risk in private, in essence simply relocating 
their spaces of vulnerability from the street to the home and the internet, which was 
emphasised as a particular site of female radicalisation. A German professional working with 
families to stop both young men and women joining Daesh, noted the role of the internet, 
accessed in the home, in the radicalisation of young women with whom she had contact. She 
explained that, once recruited, women and girls were then more able to successfully recruit 
other women online, as they knew what had worked for them. She suggested the consequence 
is a highly gendered ‘snowball’ impact, as young women tend to have large social networks, 
and spend a lot of time messaging online. The impact of Daesh in explicitly fostering online 
relationships with young women meant, she said, that ‘grooming’ narratives might actually 
apply to women more than men. This finding is consistent with a number of emerging online 
studies.58 The finding contextualises community beliefs about the role of the internet in 
radicalisation. While it was emphasised by the milieu, there appeared to be gender 
differences in male and female radicalisation, due to both cultural norms and differences in 
male and female internet use.  
 
Indeed, a number of expert participants reported direct knowledge of cases of radicalisation 
both online and offline through men proposing marriage. This was evidenced in accounts 
from expert participants in two focus groups. In France, one woman explained how there had 
been attempts to recruit her on Facebook, which she had resisted. A young female in Canada 
described how she had been drawn into extremism via the internet. Now deradicalised, she 
explained the ease of online radicalisation: 
 
The internet is like a drug, or alcohol. It has good aspects, but the harmful side is too big … 
There are ... some websites, where, for example, I can write anything I want and it will be 
spread.  
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These accounts, of course, do not serve to deny the targeting of young men online, which has 
also been widespread. However, the research provided data to suggest female offline 
radicalisation was more of a challenge for Daesh; additionally there were no first-hand 
accounts of male online radicalisation accounts. This warrants further exploration.  
 
[B-head] Social Network: Kinship and Friendship Groups 
Social networks and groups, whether online or offline, were highlighted as pivotal to 
radicalisation by all participants. Significantly, expert participants felt that Daesh provided 
young people with a social network or group that had previously been missing. One man in 
Germany suggested that this was entwined with theological arguments, ‘Then, of course, the 
other thing that’s promised … is paradise. This makes them feel they are part of this 
brotherhood around them, this society’. A Dutch expert participant meanwhile rejected the 
link with Islam but did associate radicalization with friendship, saying, ‘Mixing with the 
wrong friend is often the inducement. It is just like with the Mafia. The [radicalised] boys 
that I know were first in the coffee shop … This has nothing to do with Islam’.  
 
Dutch focus groups had more expert participants than any other country. The role of 
friendship circles was strongly emphasised, and participants described how groups of friends 
became interested in Daesh together and encouraged one another. In one case, a local group 
of male youngsters had disappeared to join Daesh together. This is consistent with Sageman’s 
‘Bunch of Guys’ theory of radicalisation to Al-Qa’ida,59 which theorises the adoption of 
ideology after the creation of groups of like minds, rather than vice versa.  
 
The importance of male kinship was also emphasised by a German expert working with 
mothers of sons radicalised to Daesh. He linked the appeal of this ‘brotherhood’ of fighters 
with the absence of fathers, and issues of masculinity. Daesh propagates hyper-masculine 
norms, with strict division between male and female roles, and limited freedoms for women. 
Men are promoted as ‘warrior’ prototypes, women’s protectors and the head of the 
household, while the ideal woman is elevated as an ideologically committed wife and mother, 
reliant on her husband.60 He suggested that the impact of stress on single-mother families, 
combined with issues of status and masculinity, had led to an interest in Daesh among young 
men he saw: 
 
 18 
the most important thing is that we very often see that fathers are not there ... This means the 
mother is overburdened – and there’s more conflict than if two parents are there. The father 
becomes this ideal figure ... And that fits in really well with this idea of the Ummah 
[community] ... the authority figure of God, the beloved brethren, the fact that there is no 
mother figure in this system. Mostly the father is there, somewhere, and that’s what we try to 
do – make contact with him. This is very much to do with masculinity – violence, 
brotherhood, power. 
 
In the case of young women, as mentioned before, online social networks appeared to be the 
primary location of female radicalisation identified by expert participants and professionals. 
However, where women had access to public spaces, and were not subject to cultural 
restrictions, they could be recruited offline via the same mechanisms as young men. This was 
relevant to the case of a young Dutch revert (a non-Muslim who has converted to Islam) who 
had travelled to Syria. Unrestricted by the cultural gender norms governing Muslim women, 
she was introduced to Islam at work, via another female revert. The young woman’s mother 
described how this progressed to attendance at a radical mosque. However, the actual 
recruitment to Daesh took place online, via a young male contact. In another case from the 
Netherlands, a Muslim focus group discussed their concerns over the ongoing radicalisation 
of a young girl known to several of them. They identified three relevant factors: offline 
contacts at a radical mosque; Facebook; and a group of radical friends abroad, contacted 
online.  
 
[A-head] Warning Signs of Radicalisation: Shared Indicators  
Interviews with professionals across countries, and with five families of young people who 
had gone to join Daesh or had attempted to, described similar indicators of routine change in 
both young men and young women. These were evident in changes in clothing, relationships, 
politics, and hobbies, which included: a new interest in political events and foreign affairs; 
conversation justifying Daesh activity; attempts to ‘convert’ family members; attempts to 
censor the ‘un-Islamic’ behaviour of family members; voluntary isolation; changes to 
clothing and appearance, including the wearing of gloves or the niqab, or growing a beard; 
changes to friendship circles accompanied by new radical friends or a boyfriend or girlfriend; 
posting political and religious material on social media; ceasing hobbies and habits seen as 
un-Islamic, such as listening to modern music; disengaging from contact with the opposite 
sex; expressions of homophobia and antisemitism; and attendance at radical mosques.  
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In the Netherlands, the mother of a teenage convert woman who travelled to Syria noted a 
number of the above indicators: 
 
Her clothing changed. First a headscarf, then long dresses and suddenly the niqab. ... She 
withdrew to her room, took down her rapper posters, threw out the hip-hop CDs.  
 
Similar observations were made by the mothers of two young radicalised men in Germany, 
both of whom were prevented from travelling to Syria. One expressed: 
 
He was evangelising the whole time ... You could see that he was extreme. He always wore 
jogging bottoms, then he began wearing ‘Islamic’ clothes. He liked Islamic State … I also 
had other people telling me what was happening. The neighbours ... had been complaining 
about [his] music, this really loud rap. Now, it was nasheeds [Islamic musical chants, used by 
Daesh as propaganda]. Also ... he was posting things on Facebook, Whatsapp. … Many 
people unfriended or blocked him – they just didn’t want to see it. 
 
These indicators, repeated by others in the research data, largely coincide with those 
documented in the academic literature. Parents found it difficult to assess the point at which 
these initial positive changes became a cause for concern. Several of the young people 
radicalising to Daesh had had difficulties at school with drugs or peer groups, and at first 
Islam appeared to provide a positive change. The difficulty was in distinguishing between 
normal teenage experimentation and when changes warranted intervention. This was 
particularly problematic for the families of those who had converted to Islam. Additionally 
there was little time for a parent to assess the risk, as both professionals and families of 
radicals highlighted how quickly young people went from ‘normality’ to hijra. The family of 
the Dutch young man killed in Syria suggested two to three months; the mothers of the two 
young German men also suggested the process took only months. 
 
It was pointed out that such a short timeframe may result from both young men and women 
keeping their real views secret. One young male expert participant in Canada emphasised that 
indicators might not always therefore be obvious. He described how an acquaintance 
supported Daesh, but kept it secret from his parents: 
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You could never guess he supports ISIS, he jokes around, speaks to his parents, he goes 
outside, plays football, everything that normal people do. He is a human being like others, but 
he supports ISIS and has decided that ISIS is right.  
 
[A-head] Conclusion 
This article provides two layers of data. Expert participants, the families of ‘extremists’, and 
professionals offer fresh insights into the processes of radicalisation, as well as the indicators, 
pathways and mechanisms of recruitment. Non-expert participants offer insight into highly 
gendered cultural norms that are consistent across countries to a surprisingly high degree.  
 
This milieu – in this case Muslim heritage communities - is the one Daesh has in its sights, 
and focus group responses suggest ways in which particular recruitment messages may 
resonate – or not. The findings from the research clearly demonstrate the significance of 
gender in radicalisation, and the dangers in arguing that everything is equal between men and 
women with regard to radicalisation to Daesh. It is clear that the norms, expectations and 
structural pressures differ for men and women. 
 
While structural issues, including discrimination, alienation and socioeconomic concerns, or 
individual factors, such as belonging and identity, affect both men and women, the details of 
their impacts were highly gendered. This creates significant differences in radicalisation 
mechanisms and therefore ‘risk’. Male identity was more frequently threatened by issues of 
unemployment; participants described how Daesh offered money to recruit young men.  
 
Communities also suggested ways in which male and female resilience might differ, and 
offered insights into the assumptions that guide their own responses to the signs of 
radicalisation: a perception of young men as ‘hot-headed’ led groups to blame them, while 
expectations of the relative innocence, naïvety or innate goodness of young Muslim women 
resulted in the blame for their radicalisation being placed on others. It is also possible that 
counterterrorism narratives have additionally reinforced gender stereotypes, such as the 
notion of the groomed and naïve ‘jihadi bride’. Further research should be conducted. 
 
A complex understanding of agency was noted. Women were at times ascribed less agency 
and blame, while young female research participants emphasised the significance of young 
Muslim women deliberately seeking to challenge both traditional and Western-imposed 
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gender norms, by seeking a new identity for themselves. Women’s identity was often deeply 
pious, and exclusion by the wider society because of this was clearly an important factor in 
radicalisation. A lack of acceptance of the headscarf, niqab or traditional long black robes 
was perceived as influential in the perception that Daesh might represent (and indeed 
publicises itself as) somewhere that some women felt – in terms of appearance at least – they 
better belonged, and were empowered. Importantly a lack of acceptance from within Muslim 
communities was cited, as well as from wider society, particularly in legislation banning the 
veil or scarf. These insights suggest ways in which Daesh messaging may be likely to 
resonate within milieus, and the importance of state action. It was in those countries where 
full or partial hijab, burqa and veil bans have been enforced that this pushback was 
emphasised by young pious women. 
 
The contradictions and ambiguities expressed by research participants reflect the need to 
avoid generalisations or oversimplified explanations. Political commitment and an emotional 
pull to Daesh are not mutually exclusive for either young men or women. Nor should 
emotional factors, such as love or marriage, imply that women’s actions are not rational, or 
feed ‘brainwashing’ explanations. This complex engagement of women (and men) with 
hybrid identities, and the different expectations of women in different domains, does not lend 
itself to easy conclusions about the reasons for female radicalisation. However, it is clear that 
the layers of family, community and societal responses to increased religiosity impact on 
feelings of belonging, civic inclusion and in some cases, alienation. Issues of women’s access 
to full citizenship i.e. through an ability to wear what they wanted were connected with travel 
to Syria and Iraq. 
 
 
Daesh has proven able to exploit these issues through varying recruitment mechanisms, 
including method and location. Violent Salafi doctrine does not allow for a public role for 
women, or for contact between the sexes. As a result, radicalisation may take place more 
frequently online for women rather than men, although peer groups are vital for both genders. 
These differences also reflect the daily lived realities for young Muslim men and women. 
Expert participants reported that recruiters are frequently from the same backgrounds as those 
they are targetting, and understand the arguments that are most likely to appeal. This points to 
the need to ensure that CVE programmes take account of the physical, cultural and practical 
factors affecting Muslim men and women. This also means online grooming narratives more 
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often apply to young women, although this does not render them devoid of agency. Gender 
dynamics do not prevent radicalisation for women, but instead relocate their spaces of 
vulnerability for example to the online world. This is an area requiring further research.  
 
The need to build the resilience of young people is described as crucial, highly gendered and 
a key factor in radicalisation. Working with young men and women to increase self-esteem 
should be an important area of future focus for CVE. This is a long-term project, although 
worryingly, research shows radicalisation to Daesh may be short term, sometimes taking only 
weeks. 
 
Radicalisation clearly has an impact on individuals, families and wider communities. Given 
the relatively small scale of the research for this article, it is proposed that further, longer-
term studies be conducted, particularly with radicalised women and those who have returned 
from Iraq and Syria. It will be important to investigate the ways in which radicalisation to 
Daesh may adapt, particularly given the increasing lack of emphasis on hijra as Daesh loses 
territory, in favour of a growing commitment to terror attacks in the West, and to observe 
how this may influence and impact on both men and women.  
 
It is hoped that the information provided by the participants in this research can inform a 
gendered approach to CVE, not only for female radicalisation, but also for men; and it is 
hoped the community insights will inform state responses, not only to extremists, but also to 
Islam and protection for Muslim rights, while also safeguarding against extremism.  
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